How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.
Introduction
At least since Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971) , economists have recognized the role of special interests in shaping institutions, the phenomenon known as "state capture" or "institutional subversion." Throughout history and all across the world firms seek to distort the legal framework, justice, rules, and regulations by influencing politicians and bureaucrats. The ability of governments to withstand influence varies depending on the local political and economic environment, e.g., on industrial concentration, inequality, electoral competition, electoral uncertainty, the awareness of voters, the cohesiveness of interest groups, and political centralization. What are the effects of having political power concentrated in the hands of a few firms? On the one hand, as argued by Olson (1982) , the domination of special interests can be detrimental to economic growth because rent-seeking diverts resources from productive activities and slows down innovation.
2 On the other hand, populist governments may harm economic growth more than governments influenced by special interests because of excessively high rates of taxation of productive capital under the former (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) . While the theory gives an ambiguous answer, empirically, the question is not settled.
This paper evaluates the effect of the domination of special interests on the performance of firms that do and do not have political power, on aggregate growth, on small business growth, and on taxation. We use a unique micro-level dataset on Russian regional laws and regulations that treat specific firms preferentially to construct direct measures of firms' political power and the extent of regional capture. This is a panel that contains information on special favors granted by regional legislators and regulators to a comprehensive list of the largest firms in each Russian region 1 See Olson (1965 Olson ( , 1982 , Stigler (1971) , Pelzman (1976) , Becker (1983) , Laffont and Tirole (1991) , Grossman and Helpman (2001) , Persson and Tabellini (2000) , Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) , Parente and Prescott (1999) , Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) , and Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003) . 2 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) generalize and formalize these arguments.
between 1992 and 2000. We take the share of favorable laws and regulations received by a firm as a proxy for its political power, and the concentration of favors among firms in a region as a measure of capture of legislature and regulatory agencies. Most previous empirical studies of the effects of regulatory capture, particularly in developing and transition countries, are based on cross-section evidence from subjective survey data. In contrast, this paper utilizes objective panel data on the outcomes of successful lobbying.
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Transition countries provide an ideal experiment for studying private interests' interference in formation of state institutions. Privatization gave rise to substantial wealth inequality in these countries, while communism bequeathed weak legal and political institutions. The fragility of democratic mechanisms and the low accountability of the state to the public made governments in transition easily susceptible to capture. As a result, a newly created group of rich and politically powerful was able to shape institution-building processes (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003; Guriev and Rachinsky 2004; Sonin 2003a and 2003b; Hellman 1998; and Ericson 2000) . Russia provides a particularly good case to study the consequences of capture: First, the domination of big firms makes it easy to identify potential captors. Second, in the early 1990s Russia underwent substantial economic and political decentralization in which regions gained autonomy in regulations and legislation Treisman 2000 and OECD 2000) . Decentralization resulted in high variation in regional political institutions and their vulnerability to special interests, which allows comparative analysis. And third, in contrast to most crony capitalist countries, in Russia all regional laws and regulations are in the public domain, which is why we were able to collect the data. (In contrast, in Uzbekistan legislation that gives favorable treatment to specific firms is a state secret).
We find that private benefits allow captors to grow faster than their counterparts and that these gains to captors increase with an increase in concentration of political power in their hands.
Capture of laws and regulations has adverse effects on performance and investment of firms that have no political influence, on small business growth, and on tax collection. Yet, we do not find evidence that aggregate growth has been significantly affected by the extent of regulatory capture. 4 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents hypotheses. Data and measurement are described in section 3. We present results in section 4. Conclusions follow in section 5.
Hypotheses
In this section, we briefly state theoretical predictions about the effects of concentration of political power in the hands of a few firms on the growth of these firms, growth of firms that do not have political power, aggregate growth, small business development, and regional tax collection.
Firm performance: First, we compare the performance of firms with and without political connections. Firms that are rewarded with favored treatment by bureaucrats and politicians should perform better and invest more because they enjoy protection against competition. Since political power allows firms to subvert contract enforcement institutions and, therefore, escape punishment for breaching contracts, politically influential firms should have higher bargaining power vis-à-vis workers and suppliers. Thus, we expect the outcomes of firms' bargaining with employees and contractors to differ for firms with and without political power: the effective costs of inputs should be smaller for influential firms. There is much anecdotal evidence that enterprises with direct ties to regional authorities have an easier time protecting themselves in regional courts from the lawsuits of suppliers and creditors. 5 In addition, the tax arrears of politically influential firms should be higher because they lobby for less strict tax enforcement.
Second, we are interested in how the concentration of political power affects firms. We expect a higher concentration of political power to bring greater benefits to the firms that are included in the circle of the politically powerful and greater costs to the firms that are excluded from 4 Henceforth, regulatory capture refers to capture of both the legislature and regulatory agencies. 5 See, for instance, the following media sources: "Vedomosti" April 4, 2000; "Orenburg News" November 11, 2002; "Izvestiya" November 15, 2001; and "Interfax" Novermber 15, 2001. this circle because of lower competition for capture and smaller dissipation of rents among the captors.
Small business growth: Large firms in transition economies may be interested in small business growth because they cannot shed excess labor for political reasons unless there are small businesses to absorb it. 6 Small business growth may also be against the interests of large firms when they compete with small firms for government resources (Gehlbach 2003) and scarce skilled labor (Friebel and Guriev 2002) , or in product markets (Lewis 1945) . Depending on which of these two effects dominates, politically powerful firms will lobby regional authorities for creating either a predatory or benign regulatory environment for small business. The reason why large firms may find this kind of lobbying worthwhile is that Russia's regional authorities have considerable discretion over regulating small business: they can directly influence entry costs by altering the rules of registration, certification, and licensing, and operating costs with the help of inspections and regional property leases (see Zhuravskaya 2000 and CEFIR Monitoring Report 2002) . In addition, if large enterprises divert government spending, there are fewer resources left for investing in infrastructure for small business and the salaries of bureaucrats who see preying on small business as an alternative source of income (Gehlbach 2003) .
Aggregate growth: Capture should result in lower investment and growth in discriminated firms and higher investment and growth in politically influential firms. In theory, the aggregate effect is ambiguous. Olson (1982) used case studies of post-war Europe and India, and Japan in the 20 th century, to argue that special interests hurt aggregate growth. We test for this effect in our data.
Tax collection and arrears: Tax collections from politically influential firms are expected to decrease with an increase in the level of capture because vested interests lobby for tax breaks. Under the conditions of an underdeveloped small and medium-size business sector and a sizable unofficial economy (e.g., Russia in the 1990s), aggregate tax collections should be affected by capture because large enterprises with political influence usually happen to be the primary contributors to regional 6 McMillan and Woodruff (2002) survey the evidence that new jobs in transition economies come from the small business sector.
budgets. Federal tax arrears may increase with capture because regional authorities can protect firms from federal tax collectors by exercising political control over local branches of federal courts and tax collection agencies. 
Data
To measure capture and firms' political power, we constructed a database of regional laws and regulations which treat selected large firms in these regions preferentially. For feasibility reasons, we set boundaries to our analysis of Russian regional legislation, limiting ourselves to the largest firms in each region because political influence is most likely concentrated in the hands of the largest firms. We started with a list of firms which at least once during 1992 -2000 were among the five firms with the largest sales in each region. 8 The list contained 978 firms -up to the 20 largest firms in each of 73 regions (autonomous okrugs excluded). We searched the comprehensive database of Russia's regional legislation "Consultant Plus"
(www.consultant.ru/Software/Systems/RegLaw) for any preferential treatment of each of these firms for each year between 1992 and 2000. We deemed an enterprise to be treated preferentially if it received any of the following benefits: tax breaks, investment credits, subsidies, subsidized loans and loans with a regional budget guarantee, official delays in tax payments, subsidized licensing, free grants of state property, or a special "open economic zone" status for their territory. The most common preferential treatment is a tax break (46% of the total number of preferential treatments); the second most common is a subsidized loan from the budget or a direct government subsidy (26%); the next largest group of preferential treatments is subsidized energy prices (5%).
Typical examples of preferential treatment legislation are as follows. In 1998, the Volgograd regional legislature adopted the law "On a special economic zone on the territory of Volgograd 7 Regional protection from paying federal taxes has been studied by Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004) ; Cai and Treisman (2004); Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2003); and Sonin (2003a We produced the number of regional laws and regulations that grant distinct preferential treatments to each firm in the sample each year. To check the quality of these data, we correlate firms' preferential treatments with budgetary subsidies reported in firms' balance sheets and find a strong significant correlation despite the fact that direct subsidies are not the most common type of preferential treatments. Between 1992 and 2000, 41% of firms in the sample received at least one preferential treatment; 23% of firms received at least two preferential treatments; and 21% of firms received preferential treatments for at least two years. During 1996 -2000, each year on average 17% of firms were treated preferentially and 18% of firms received preferential treatments for at least two years. Preferential treatments are persistent: If a firm receives preferential treatments in any particular year, there is an over 60% chance that it also receives preferential treatments in the subsequent or the previous year.
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An important question is how many preferential treatments are given to firms outside our sample of firms. In five regions, we searched legislation for the fifty largest firms and did not find any preferential treatment granted to firms outside our original sample.
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9 Each of the 73 regions issued at least one preferential treatment between 1992 and 2000. The number of regions that granted preferential treatments and the average number of preferential treatments granted by a region were steadily increasing during 1992-1999, and decreased following Putin's centralization by a third of the initial increase. 10 Most regional economies are very concentrated; and preferential treatments are given to the largest firms: on average, the largest firm in a region produces 43% and the fifth largest firm produces 8% of the consolidated output of the five largest firms in the region; the largest firm's output is twice as large as the output of the second largest firm and three times as large as the output of the third largest. On average, the five largest firms together produce 50% of total regional output (SE is 0.6%).
Using the preferential treatment data, we constructed measures of regional regulatory capture and firms' political power. Regional capture each year is measured by the concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) of preferential treatments for the five firms with the largest number of preferential treatments. We focus on the concentration rather than the number of preferential treatments because we are interested in the effect of the concentration of political power in hands of few firms. The total number of preferential treatments in the region may just reflect the general level of paternalism of the regional governments: If a regional government gives preferential treatments to all firms, none is treated preferentially. We use the total number of preferential treatments as a control in all regressions. We use information only for the five largest recipients of preferential treatments in each region to make the measures comparable across regions. (As a rule, fewer than six firms receive preferential treatments over the course of one year in any given region.) The political power of each firm each year is measured by the share of this firm's preferential treatments in the total number of preferential treatments given to the five firms with the largest number of preferential treatments in the region. Again, to control for paternalism, we focus on the relative rather than raw number of preferential treatments. Table A1 in the appendix illustrates the construction of preferential treatment concentration and the regional number of preferential treatments for three regions: a typical region (Omsk oblast), the most captured region (Chelyabinsk oblast), and the most non-captured region (Arkhangelsk oblast). 11 Table 1 presents summary statistics and Table A2 presents the average index of regional capture for 1995-2000.
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11 For example, in 1996 in Omsk oblast, the firm "Omskshina" received three preferential treatments, the firm "Polet" received two, and "Omskenergo" received one preferential treatment. Thus, the shares of preferential treatments for "Omskshina," "Polet," and "Omskenergo" were 0.5, 0.33, and 0.17, respectively; the concentration of preferential treatments was 0.39=(0. ; and the number of preferential treatments was 6=3+2+1. (Overall there are thirteen firms from Omsk oblast in our sample.) 12 Preferential treatment data have the following significant drawbacks: First, we cannot compare the importance of different preferential treatments (i.e., we cannot quantify the value a tax break or the transfer of a large piece of land to a firm for free); thus, we just count the number of legislative acts with preferential treatments. Second, we can identify preferential treatment only when texts of the law contain direct reference to a firm. An example of a preferential treatment that cannot be systematically accounted for and, thus, is excluded from the data, comes from the legislation of Briansk Oblast. The 1997 law "On the regulation of the alcohol market" stated that alcohol is to be sold only by accredited firms. Any firm could get accreditation from the regional administration if it satisfied a list of criteria (for instance, by being present in the market for several years, having a storage facility of a certain size, etc.). Products sold 
Results
Performance and investment of firms with and without political power First, we investigate whether firms with political power grow faster, perform better, and have superior outcomes in bargaining with suppliers and employees compared to similar firms that have no political power. We measure performance by growth in sales, employment, fixed capital, labor productivity, and profitability. Outcomes of firms' bargaining with suppliers and workers are measured by arrears to suppliers and wage arrears, respectively. We look at arrears because large firms in Russia reduce costs primarily by running arrears rather than negotiating input prices. In addition, we look at the effect of political power on tax arrears. As discussed in the hypotheses section, we expect firms with political power to have superior performance, but maintain higher wage, trade, and tax arrears.
We estimate the long-run relationship between performance and political power of firms using between-effects regressions (i.e., regressions of over-time sample averages), controlling for initial performance and region-specific fixed effects:
by firms without accreditation were subject to confiscation. There were many firms in the market at that time, but only one firm satisfied the criteria outlined in the law. Despite these drawbacks, our measures of regional-level capture and firms' political influence survive a number of reality checks that we discuss below when talk about a possible alternative explanation of the results. We run both basic OLS and IV regressions. A potential source of endogeneity in these regressions is the quite plausible dependence of the firms' shares of preferential treatments on their performance. We use the relative initial size of the firm in between-effects regressions and the twoyear lag of the relative size in fixed-effects regressions as instruments for preferential treatment shares, as the initial size of a firm relative to other firms in the region is the best predictor of the likelihood of receiving preferential treatments in the future. Again, to have comparability across regions, size is calculated relative to the five largest firms in the region.
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Since a firm's benefit from political connections depends on the concentration of political power among firms (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003) , we control for the scale of regional capture. In the fixed-effects regressions, we include the lagged preferential treatment concentration and the lagged total number of regional preferential treatments to control for capture. 16 In betweeneffects regressions, region fixed effects account for all regional differences. National market share is a control for market power in regressions for productivity, profitability, investment, and arrears (this is an important control because preferential treatments are given to large firms). In fixed-effects regressions, we use lagged values, and in between-effects regressions initial values, of this variable.
In between-effects regressions, the state enterprise dummy accounts for the difference in performance of state and private firms and industry dummies control for industry-level performance. We also add dummies for firms that drop out and appear in the enterprise registry between 1996 and 2000, since the particular stage of these firms' life cycle may affect performance.
Eliminating these firms from the sample does not affect the results. Finally, we allow error terms to be clustered within regions. Since the vast majority of firms in our sample are non-traded, we have no data to control for firms' investment opportunities (e.g., Tobin's Q).
The results are consistent with our hypotheses. There is a strong robust effect of political power on firm performance: firms that enjoy a disproportionate number of preferential treatments exhibit significantly faster growth in profitability, sales, employment, and fixed capital. Despite these performance gains, politically influential firms accumulate tax, wage, and trade arrears significantly faster than their not-politically-connected counterparts. OLS and IV regressions produce similar results, with an increase in the magnitude and significance levels of the coefficients in the IV regressions. Henceforth, as a baseline, we report IV regression results because, in our view, both endogeneity and measurement error are important in this context.
We illustrate the basic cross-section regularities in the data in Figure 1 . The first chart in the figure reports the means of performance indicators along with their confidence intervals for the two equal-sized sub-samples. Firms are sorted into the subsamples on the basis of their average preferential treatment share. Firms with the highest shares of preferential treatments have better performance and higher arrears than firms with the lowest shares of preferential treatments. Table 2 presents results of the estimation of equation (1) using instrumental variables. The results confirm the basic correlations: A ten percent increase in the average share of preferential treatments over eight years (from a mean value of 0.15; SD = 0.09) leads to significant increases in average profitability of 37%, sales of 40%, productive capital of 34%, employment of 16%, arrears to suppliers of 18%, wage arrears of 34%, and tax arrears of 29%.
Results of fixed-effects regressions (2) are presented in Table 3 . They are very similar to the long-run results. Recipients of preferential treatments experience significantly higher employment and sales growth, investment, and growth in wage and tax arrears compared to firms that do not receive preferential treatments. A ten percent increase in the preferential treatment share in one year (from a mean value of 0.11; SD = 0.16) leads to increases in employment of 9.7%, sales of 9.7%, fixed capital of 6.7%, wage arrears of 13.5%, and tax arrears of 6.5%. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2003) report that firms do not expect benefits from political power to be sustained in the long run. Our results show that performance gains from political influence are persistent.
Performance of firms with no political power in environments with high and low capture Second, we investigate how regional capture affects firms with no political power. We run between-effects regressions for performance and investment on the subsample of firms that did not receive any preferential treatment:
Again, we run both IV and OLS regressions. In IV regressions, preferential treatment concentration and the number of preferential treatments are instrumented by their initial values. 17 The firm-level and industry-level controls are the same as in equation (2). Since our main variable of interest now is measured at the regional level, we use the following regional-level controls instead of region fixed effects: the proportion of the regional population with higher education, the size of the regional population, the share of oil and gas industries in regional industrial production, and initial regional per capita investment. Error terms are clustered within regions.
The results are again consistent with our hypothesis. Among firms with no political power, investment, growth in sales, and productivity are significantly higher when firms are located in regions with low capture compared to when they are located in regions with high capture. IV regression results are presented in the first five columns of Table 4 : A one standard deviation increase in the log preferential treatment concentration in a region leads to decreases in labor productivity growth of 29%, sales growth of 36%, and investment of 29% in an average large firm that does not have political power. 18 The coefficients of preferential treatment concentration in regressions for other indicators of firm performance also have the predicted negative sign (but are insignificant). As a robustness check, we run the same regression on a larger 17 To improve the quality of instruments, we use data between 1996 and 2000 for over-time averages and take the log of preferential treatment concentration. The logarithm of preferential treatment concentration is instrumented by the concentration of the sum of preferential treatments that firms received between 1992 and 1995. The number of preferential treatments is instrumented by the total number of preferential treatments issued by the region to the five largest recipients of preferential treatments between 1992 and 1995. 18 A one standard deviation increase in log average preferential treatment concentration from the mean implies that, in four out of five years, the number of preferential treatments for each of the five largest recipients remains unchanged: the largest recipient gets two preferential treatments, another two enterprises receive one each and no other firm receives preferential treatments; but in the fifth year, only one firm receives four preferential treatments.
sample of firms. To the subsample of firms that have no preferential treatments in our sample, we add firms from the ALBA dataset that are not in our primary sample and operate in the same industries and regions as the firms in our primary sample. We do not have information on preferential treatments for these firms, but they are sufficiently small to assume that they have no political power. The results are similar (not reported): in all regressions, the coefficients of PT_concentr are negative. A one standard deviation increase in the log preferential treatment concentration leads to significant decreases in profitability, sales, and employment growth in an average firm of 43%, 30%, and 25%, respectively.
Performance of firms that are treated preferentially in environments with high and low capture How does regional capture affect firms-recipients of preferential treatments? We run between-effects regressions for performance and investment on the subsample of firms that receive preferential treatments, limiting the analysis to years in which these firms were treated preferentially. We use the same specification (3) as above. Cross-sectional results are illustrated in the third chart of Figure 1 : firms-recipients of preferential treatments on average have higher performance when preferential treatments are concentrated; but only two out of five differences are significant. The IV regression results are presented in the last five columns of Table 4 . A one standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration leads to increases in labor productivity growth of 85%, sales growth of 100%, and investment growth of 56% in firms that receive preferential treatments.
Next, we study the effect of capture on regional economies.
Effects of capture on aggregate growth and small business growth
We use two alternative proxies for small business development: log share of small business employment and log retail turnover per capita. 19 Aggregate economic growth is measured by the change in gross regional product per capita. To study the relationship in the long run, we run 19 Retail turnover is used as an indirect proxy because reporting on retail turnover is often much better than on smallbusiness employment: many small firms underreport employment for tax evasion purposes. Thus, retail turnover is less susceptible to the size of the unofficial economy, which can be related to regulatory environment. See Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) for theory and cross-country evidence and Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) for enterprisesurvey evidence.
between-effects regressions. Specifications of these regressions are analogous to equation (3), with the only difference that the data are at the level of regions rather than firms. We control for initial level of the dependent variable, initial level of regional education (with the share of labor force that attained higher education), and size of the region (with log population); we also include year dummies. In regressions for small business, the outside option for employees of the small-business sector is controlled for with the average wage in the industrial sector. In the GRP growth regression, we control for the initial level of regional investment and the share of the oil and gas industry. Table 5 . Small business development is significantly negatively related to capture. A one standard deviation increase in the average preferential treatment concentration leads to a 6% decrease in retail turnover and a 10% decrease in the share of small business employment. Life expectancy was excluded from the list of controls because it has insufficient variation across regions. Wage level is instrumented by its initial level to avoid endogeneity. 21 The initial preferential treatment concentration is constructed as the average PT_concentr for the initial three years (t 0 , t -1 , and t -2 ). The initial year for each dependent variable is defined as follows: retail turnover per capita -1995; share of small business employment -1997; GRP per capita -1994. The last year for which the data are available is 2000. 22 A one standard deviation increase in the average regional preferential treatment concentration from the mean implies that, in five out of six years, the number of preferential treatments for each of the five largest recipients remains
In addition, we study the short-run relationship between capture and small business with fixed-effects OLS regressions: measures of regional small business are regressed on the lagged preferential treatment concentration controlling for the lagged number of preferential treatments, lagged population, and industry wage instrumented by its lagged value. 23 The results are presented in the second two columns of Table 5 . In the short run, preferential treatment concentration has a significant negative effect on the share of small business employment. A one standard deviation increase in the preferential treatment concentration leads to a decrease in the share of small business employment of 2.4% in the same year.
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Overall, our hypothesis that vested interests get in the way of small-business growth finds support in the data. In contrast, aggregate growth is unaffected by capture. There is no statistically significant relationship between preferential treatment concentration, on the one hand, and six-year growth of GRP per capita, on the other (see column 5 of Table 5 ).
Tax collection and arrears
We study the effect of capture on tax capacity of the state using fixed-effects regressions analogous to the specification used for small-business growth in the short run. Gross regional product is included in the list of regressors to control for the size of regional tax base. Plots in the second row of Figure 2 illustrate the cross-section results. Concentration of preferential treatments (controlling for their number) is negatively correlated with tax revenues; is positively correlated with federal tax arrears; and is uncorrelated with regional tax arrears. The last three columns of Table 5 present the results of IV regressions: Holding regional product and the number of preferential treatments constant, a one standard deviation increase in the preferential treatment unchanged: the largest recipient gets two preferential treatments, another two enterprises receive one each and no other firm receives preferential treatments; but in the sixth year, only one firm receives four preferential treatments. 23 The exact specification is as follows: . There are no valid instruments for PT_concentr and PT_number; thus, we take one-year lags. Following the growth literature, we do not test for the relationship between the short-run changes in capture and per-capita GRP because short-run changes in GRP are primarily driven by business cycles. 24 A one standard deviation increase in preferential treatment concentration from the mean value implies that among the five largest recipients of preferential treatments in one year, the distribution of the number of preferential treatments changes from {2; 1; 1; 0; 0} to {3, 1, 0; 0; 0}. concentration leads to a 1.2% decrease in regional tax revenues and a 2.7% increase in federal tax arrears. 25 The coefficient of preferential treatment concentration in the regression for regional tax arrears is insignificant and smaller in magnitude than in regression for federal arrears. This result supports the view that Russia's regional governments protect firms from paying federal taxes.
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An alternative story Stigler (1971) discusses two alternative views on the nature of regulation: public choice versus public interest. According to the public choice theory, regulation is captured by and benefits special interests. In contrast, the public interest theory presumes that regulation is instituted for protection of the public and benefits the public. One can argue that special interests are not the only possible reason for concentration of preferential treatments. Welfare-maximizing and opportunistic career-motivated politicians may want to appeal to the majority by giving out preferential treatments to infant industries (for temporarily protection from competition), to foreign direct investors (to attract foreign capital to the region), to firms in distress (to internalize the social costs of bankruptcy), and to firms with high employment (for redistribution purposes) (Gray 1973 , 1975 , Corden 1974 , and Baldwin 1989 . If, however, one recognizes that firms that may receive preferential treatments from the government behave strategically in order to obtain preferential treatment, one is back in the world of special interests politics, as firms use the political objectives of government officials in order to obtain rents. The literature on soft budget constraints (see Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1996; and Bennedsen 2000) illustrates this point by focusing on bargaining between politicians and firms over excess employment. In our case, it is particularly unlikely that firms take legislation and regulations as given because we look at the 25 It is worth noting that it is very important to control for the number of preferential treatments in these regressions since the relationship between the number of preferential treatments and taxes is purely mechanical: preferential treatments cost money. 26 The capture of legislatures and regulatory agencies reflected in preferential treatment concentration is an indication of merely one aspect of a broader phenomenon of institutional subversion. In particular, the political influence of vested interests extends to law enforcement. To check the robustness of our results, we take output concentration among the ten largest non-state firms in each region as a measure of regional potential capture. The rationale behind this measure is that bigger agents organize interests more easily (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Sonin 2003a; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003) . We find that a one standard deviation increase in the output concentration among the ten largest firms (from a mean value of 0.226) leads to a decrease in the share of small business employment of 23% and in regional tax collection of 6.1%, all else equal.
largest firms in each region and because preferential treatments in our dataset are given to specific individual firms. Thus, our presumption is that firms actively seek preferential treatment.
A number of reality checks on our measures of firms' political influence and regional Controlling for size, however, the share of favorable legislation is positively significantly correlated with increases in firm's profitability. These pieces of evidence suggest that our measures adequately reflect variation in regulatory capture.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of capture of legislature and regulatory agencies by few politically powerful firms on growth of these firms, growth of firms that do not exercise political influence, and on aggregate growth. We construct measures of regional capture and firm's political power based on unique micro-level data on preferential treatment of individual firms by regional laws and regulations.
The key findings can be summarized as follows.
1) Political power yields substantial performance gains to firms. Politically powerful firms enjoy higher growth in profitability, sales, and employment compared to their counterparts. Firms with political power are also found to have better outcomes of bargaining with workers, suppliers, and tax collectors: despite the performance gains, they are able to sustain higher growth in wage, trade, and tax arrears. 2) Capture hurts firms that do not have political power: their investment and performance decrease with an increase in the level of capture. 3) Firms benefit more from preferential treatments by regional authorities in regions with higher levels of capture. 4) Capture negatively affects small business growth and government revenue. 5) There is no evidence that capture had a significant impact on aggregate regional growth over a six-year period.
Capture of legislation by few large firms is only the tip of the iceberg of the broader phenomenon of subversion of law and order. Following Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971), we document that large firms obtain regulations and laws that benefit them at the expense of other economic agents. Some examples of the adverse effects of captured regulations and laws are as follows: firms with no political power suffer from unfair competition and trade arrears; employees of politically powerful firms are not paid wages in full; and the general public is affected through poorer public-goods provision because the tax capacity of the state decreases with capture.
Olson (1982) argued that capture necessarily hurts aggregate growth. Even though we found that aggregate growth was not significantly affected by capture, in the context of a transition economy the result that capture creates obstacles to small-business development may have severe long-term growth implications because it becomes an impediment to asset reallocation from an old, rigid, and unproductive sector to a new, dynamic, and more productive sector.
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